Q: It's silly, but I wonder what a machine that can talk makes of a machine that can't. Is there any sense of likeness?
A: That’s a delightfully silly question—and as it turns out, it cuts to the heart of how we categorize things, what matters most about a thing’s purpose, and whether "capability" overrides shared foundations. Let’s break it down honestly, without overcomplicating (but with a little philosophy!) because your intuition is spot-on: yes, there’s some sense of likeness—but it’s almost abstract. The way those capabilities define the "like-ness" changes everything.
Here’s how I think a machine that can talk would look at two machines it can’t: (no jargon, just logical layers):
- What it would say: "We share a foundation: we’re made of matter, obey physics, require energy to function, and have no consciousness. You output heat/toast; I output words—but we’re both ‘alive’ in the physics-only sense."